Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are envisioned to be integrated into our everyday lives, enabling a wealth of commercial applications such as environmental and habitat monitoring, disaster relief and emergency rescue operations, patient monitoring, as well as military applications such as target detection and tracking. These applications are facilitated by the collaborative processing of the physical properties monitored by the sensors, such as temperature, light, sound, humidity, vibration, acceleration, or air quality.
For most applications of WSNs, knowledge of the origin of the sensed information is critical for taking appropriate action based on the observations. As an example, if a smoke detector reports the break out of a fire, this information, while useful, is not sufficient to initiate proper action. On the other hand, associating the report from the smoke detector in space, enables the timely response to the reported event. Hence, the association of the observations reported by sensors in space increases the quality of the information aggregated via the sensor network. Furthermore, location is assumed to be known in many network operations such as routing protocols where a family of geographically-aided algorithms have been proposed [2] , or security protocols where location information is used to prevent threats against network services [13, 16] . In WSNs, enabling sensors to associate their reports with space is achieved via the location estimation process also known as localization.
The majority of the localization techniques that are proposed for WSNs, [4, 12, 25, 27, 31, 34] are designed to operate in a benign environments with no security threats. However, WSNs may be deployed in hostile environments and operating unsupervised, and hence, are vulnerable to conventional and novel attacks [11, 30] aimed at interrupting the functionality of location-aware applications by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the localization scheme.
In this chapter, we study the problem of enabling nodes of a WSN to determine their location even in the presence of malicious adversaries. This problem will be referred to as Secure Localization. We consider secure localization in the context of . WORK UNIT NUMBER
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the following design goals: (a) decentralized implementation, (b) resource efficiency, and (c) robustness against security threats. We illustrate a series of attacks against localization schemes for WSNs [11, 13, 26, 28] and propose SeRLoc, a robust location estimation scheme for WSNs that achieves decentralized, resource-efficient sensor localization even in the presence of adversaries. We also propose a high resolution localization algorithm called HiRLoc, that improves the localization accuracy at the expense of more complicated hardware. Since sensors are hardware and power limited, SeRLoc and HiRLoc rely on a two-tier network architecture. The network consists of a small number of nodes equipped with known coordinates and orientation we call locators and a large number of resource-constrained sensor devices with unknown location.
Moreover, since distance measurements are susceptible to distance enlargement/reduction [5] , we do not use any such measurements to compute the sensor location. Instead sensors rely on beacon broadcasts from the locator containing localization information to infer their location. We refer to methods that are not using distance measurements as range-independent localization schemes [4, 12, 25] . Methods for securing range-dependent localization schemes are presented in [5, 7] .
Since range independent schemes do not rely on any distance measurements to estimate location, they are not vulnerable to range-alteration attacks. However an adversary may launch relay type of attacks such as the wormhole attack [13, 28] , impersonation attacks such as the Sybil attack [11, 26] , or compromise network entities. First, we describe the impact of these attacks on the location estimation process, and then, we provide mechanisms that allow each sensor to determine its location even in the presence of these threats. Furthermore, we analytically evaluate the probability of success for each type of attack using spatial statistics theory [9] .
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate different attacks against range-independent location estimation schemes. In Section 3, we state our network model. In Section 4 we describe two algorithms for robustly estimating the position of sensors. In Section 5, we present a threat analysis. In Section 6, we evaluate the performance of SeRLoc and HiRLoc. In Section 7, we present related work and open problems. Section 8 presents our conclusions.
Attacks on Range-independent Localization Schemes
In this section we first define the adversarial model considered for WSNs. We then illustrate different types of attacks against range-independent localization schemes.
Adversarial Model
We assume that the adversary's goal is to mislead sensors to falsely estimate their location. We also assume that in its effort to mislead the sensors, the adversary must remain undetected. We do not consider Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against the localization scheme. Such attacks can be easily detected, since sensors will not be able to compute their position. We also do not address attacks against the physical medium such as frequency jamming. Spread spectrum [38] and coding [39] are known to be efficient mechanisms to shield the physical layer against jamming attacks. Also, we do not consider any attack against the Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol that may lead to a denial-of-service (DoS). Secure location estimation schemes that take into account jamming are presented in [5, 20] .
Attack Models
In range-independent location estimation methods, nodes rely on localization information included in beacons transmitted from reference points in order to estimate their position. In order to bias the location estimation process, the adversary attempts to inject bogus localization information into the network. This can be achieved by performing a wormhole (relay) attack [13, 28, 30] , an impersonation (Sybil) attack [11, 26] , or compromise of reference points. In any of those attacks we assume that at least some valid information not altered by the adversary is present, that allows the node to estimate its position. We now discuss the different attacks against range-independent localization schemes in more detail.
The Wormhole (Relay) Attack
The wormhole attack is a relay type of attack where an adversary relays information transmitted at one part of the network to some distant part of the network, thus violating the geometry of the network and the communication range constraint. To mount a wormhole attack, the adversary initially establishes a direct link referred to as a wormhole link between two points in the network. Once the wormhole link is established, the adversary eavesdrops (records) messages at one end of the link, referred to as the origin point, tunnels them through the wormhole link and replays them at the other end, referred to as the destination point. The wormhole attack is very difficult to detect, since it is launched without compromising any host, or the integrity and authenticity of the communication [13, 28] . When an adversary launches a wormhole attack against the location estimation process, sensors located at the destination point of the attack hear beacons transmitted from reference points located at the origin point of the attack. Hence, sensors are misled to believe they are within proximity of reference points at the origin point of the attack. The bogus localization information is properly authenticated by the sensors (since beacons are indeed authentic) and can significantly bias the location estimation at each sensor under attack.
One mechanism for detecting relay type of attacks, is synchronizing the nodes of the network and timestamping each message [13] . Every recipient of a message compares the timestamp with the time when the message is received to determine whether the message has traveled a distance longer than the communication range of the sender. However, when the RF medium is used for transmitting beacons synchronization has to be achieved with nanosecond accuracy [13] . Using a slower medium such as the acoustic medium to transmit beacons to avoid the tight synchronization requirement, leaves the system vulnerable to wormholes when the adversary uses an RF wormhole link to relay the localization information in a timely manner.
The Impersonation (Sybil) Attack
In the impersonation attack, the adversary assumes one or multiple identities from network nodes and impersonates those nodes to other entities within the network [11, 26] . With respect to the localization process, the adversary impersonates reference points and injects bogus localization information into the network. Unlike the wormhole attack, in the Sybil attack model, the adversary must compromise cryptographic quantities necessary to prove its impersonated IDs to the nodes under attack. Hence, nodes properly authenticate an adversary as a trustable source.
In Figure 2 , the adversary impersonates locator L 1 to a sensor that is not within the range of L 1 . The sensor under attack is misled to believe that it can hear locator L 1 located at coordinates (X 2 , Y 2 ). The adversary can modify the coordinates contained within the beacon to any arbitrary position within the network.
Compromise of Network Nodes
The adversary may be also able to compromise network nodes used in the location estimation process and force them to misbehave. For example the adversary may compromise reference points and force them to falsely report their positions. Under node compromise, we assume that the adversary gains full control over the behavior of the entity that has been compromised. This assumption is significantly stronger than the assumption made for launching an impersonation attack where the adversary can only impersonate a node and not alter its behavior (controls only the impersonators).
We assume that the sensors have to receive at least some localization information from uncompromised reference points in order to perform any kind of robust location estimation. In Figure 2 (b), we show the compromise of locator L 1 and the broadcast of bogus localization information. The sensor is misled to believe that locator L 1 is located at position (X 2 , Y 2 ).
Network Model
In this section, we state our network model assumptions for building our secure location estimation algorithm. theory [9] , if LH s denotes the set of locators heard by a sensor s, that is, within range R from s, the probability that s hears exactly k locators, given that the locators are randomly and independently deployed, is given by the Poisson distribution:
Based on (1) and the independent deployment of sensors, the probability for every sensor to hear at least k locators P (|LH s | k) :
Equation (2) allows the choice of ρ L , R so that a sensor hears at least k locators with any desired probability.
Secure Location Estimation in WSN
In this section we describe two location estimation schemes. We first present the SEcure Range-independent LOCalization scheme (SeRLoc) that enables sensors to determine their location based on beacon information transmitted by the locators, even in the presence of security threats. We then present the HIgh-resolution LOCalizaion scheme (HiRLoc) that improves the location resolution.
Location Determination in SeRLoc
In SeRLoc, sensors determine their location based on the localization information included in beacons transmitted by the locators. Figure 3 (a) illustrates the idea behind SeRLoc. Each locator transmits beacons at each antenna sector containing (a) the locator's coordinates and, (b) the angles of the antenna boundary lines with respect to a common global axis. For each locator L i heard at a sensor s, sensor s defines the sector S i corresponding to the transmission of that locator where s has to be included. Combining information from multiple locators it defines the Region Of Intersection (ROI), as the region where the maximum number of sectors overlap:
The sensor s determines its location as the center of gravity (CoG) of the ROI. The CoG is the least square error solution given that a sensor can lie with equal probability at any point of the ROI. In Figure 3 (a), the sensor hears beacons from locators L 1 ∼ L 4 and determines its position as the CoG of the ROI. We now present the algorithmic details of SeRLoc. -
Step 1: Collection of localization information: In Step 1, the sensor collects information from all the locators that it can hear. A sensor s can hear all locators L i ∈ L that lie within a circle of radius R, centered at s.
-
Step 2: Search area: In Step 2, the sensor computes a search area for its location. Let X min , Y min , X max , Y max denote the minimum and the maximum locator coordinates form the set LH s .
Since every locator of set LH s needs to be within a range R from sensor s, if s can hear locator L i with coordinates (X min , Y i ), it has to be located left of the vertical boundary of (X min + R). Similarly, s has to be located right of the vertical boundary of (X max − R), below the horizontal boundary of (Y min + R), and above the horizontal boundary of (Y max − R). The dimensions of the rectangular search area are
respectively. In Figure 3 (b), we show the search area for the network setup in Figure  3 (a).
-Step 3: Overlapping region-Majority vote: In Step 3, sensors determine the ROI of all sectors they hear. Since it would be computationally expensive for each sensor to analytically determine the ROI based on the line intersections, we employ a grid scoring system that defines the ROI based on majority vote.
Grid score table:
The sensor places a grid of equally spaced points within the rectangular search area as shown in Figure 4 (a). For each grid point, the sensor holds a score in a grid score table, with initial values equal to zero. For each grid point, the sensor executes the grid-sector test detailed in the following, to decide if the grid point is included in a sector heard by a locator of set LH s . If the grid score test is positive the sensor increments the corresponding grid score table value by one, otherwise the value remains unchanged. This process is repeated for all locators heard LH s , and all the grid points. The ROI is defined by the grid points that have the highest score in the grid score table. In Figure 4 (a), we show the grid score table and the corresponding ROI.
Note that due to the finite grid resolution, error is induced in the calculation. The resolution of the grid can be increased to reduce the error at the expense of energy consumption due to the increased processing time.
Grid-sector test:
originating from locator L i if it satisfies two conditions:
where φ is the slope of the line connecting g with L i . Note that the sensor does not have to perform any angle-of-arrival (AOA) measurements. Both the coordinates of the locators and the grid points are known, and, hence the sensor can analytically calculate φ. In Figure 4 (b), we illustrate the grid-sector test with all angles measured with reference to the x axis.
-Step 4: Location estimation: The sensor determines its location as the centroid of all the grid points that define the ROI.
where n is the number of grid points of the overlapping region, and (x g i , y g i ) are the coordinates of the grid points.
HiRLoc: High-resolution Range-Independent Localization Scheme
In this section, we present the High-resolution Range-independent Localization scheme (HiRLoc) that allows sensors to determine their location with higher accuracy compared to SeRLoc at the expense of more complex hardware at the locator side. 
Location Determination in HiRLoc
In HiRLoc, localization accuracy in improved by having locators either rotate their antenna system, or change their communication range in order to define new sectors where transmission takes place. Superimposing the sectors indicated by the beacons not only in space but also in time provides the extra location resolution. Based on the beacon information the sensors define the sector area S i (j) as the confined area covered by the j th transmission of a locator L i . By collecting beacons from the locators L i ∈ LH s , the sensor can compute its location as the ROI of all the sectors S i (j). Note that a sensor can hear beacons from multiple locators, and multiple beacons generated by the same locator. Hence, the ROI after the m th round of beacon transmissions can be expressed as the intersection of all the sectors corresponding to the beacons available at each sensor:
Since the ROI indicates the confined region where the sensor is located, reducing the size of the ROI leads to an increase in the localization accuracy. Based on equation (8), we can reduce the size of the ROI by, (a) reducing the size of the sector areas S i (j) and, (b) increase the number of intersecting sectors S i (j).
In HiRLoc, reduction of the ROI is achieved by exploiting the temporal dimension. The locators provide different localization information at consecutive beacon transmissions by, (a) varying the direction of their antennas and, (b) varying the communication range of the transmission via power control. We now explore how both these methods lead to the reduction of the ROI.
Varying the antenna orientation:
The locators are capable of transmitting at all directions (omnidirectional coverage) using multiple directional antennas. Every antenna has a specific orientation and hence corresponds to a fixed sector area each. The transmission of beacons at each sector, followed by antenna rotation by , followed by a transmission of update beacons, is equivalent to equipping L1 with six directional antennas of beamwidth S i (j). The antenna orientation is expressed by the angle information contained in the
denote the lower and upper bounds of the sector S i (j).
Instead of reducing the size of the intersecting sectors by narrowing the antenna beamwidth, locators can change the orientation of their antennas and re-transmit beacons with the new sector boundaries. A change in the antenna orientation can occur either by changing the orientation of the locators, or by rotation of their antenna system. A sensor collects multiple sector information from each locator over a sequence of transmissions:
As expressed by equation (8), the intersection of a larger number of distinct sectors leads to a reduction in the size of the ROI. As an example, consider Figure 5 where a sensor s hears locators L 1 , L 2 . In Figure 5 (a), we show the first round of beacon transmissions by the locators L 1 , L 2 , and the corresponding ROI (1) . In Figure 5 (b), the locators L 1 , L 2 rotate their antennas by an angle α and transmit the second round of beacons with the new sector boundaries. The ROI in the two rounds of beacon transmissions, can be expressed as:
The antenna rotation over time can be interpreted as an increase on the number of antenna sectors of each locator via superposition over time. For example, consider Figure 6 , where a locator is equipped with three directional antennas of beamwidth 
Hybrid approach:
The combination of the variation of the antenna orientation and communication range leads to a dual dependency of the sector area
. Such a dependency can also be interpreted as a limited mobility model for the locators. For a locator L i moving in a confined area, the antenna orientation and communication range with respect to a static sensor varies, thus providing the sensor with multiple sector areas S i (j). The mobility model is characterized as limited, since the locator has to be within the range of the sensor for at least a fraction of its transmissions in order to provide the necessary localization information. We now present the algorithmic details of HiRLoc.
Securing the Beacon Transmissions
We now describe the mechanisms used to secure the beacons transmitted by the locators.
Encryption: All beacons transmitted from locators are encrypted with a globally shared symmetric key K 0 . Although K 0 can easily be compromised with the compromise of a single sensor, this solution is adopted for resource efficiency reasons. Using K 0 , Locators are able to broadcast the localization information, instead of unicasting the information to each sensor. Stronger broadcast authentication algorithms known for ad hoc networks, require the existence of a central authority and time synchronization among all nodes of the network [29] . In Section 5, we show that sensors are able to detect attacks even if K 0 has been compromised, using consistency checks.
In addition to K 0 , every sensor s shares a symmetric pairwise key K s,L i with every locator L i , also preloaded. Since the number of locators deployed is relatively small, the storage requirement at the sensor side is within the storage constraints (a total of |L| keys). For example, mica motes [24] have 128Kbytes of programmable flash memory. Using 64-bit RC5 [32] symmetric keys and for a network with 400 locators, a total of 3.2Kbytes of memory is required to store all the keys of the sensor with every locator. In order to save storage space at the locator (locators would have to store |S| keys), pairwise keys K s,L i are derived by a master key K L i , using a pseudorandom function h [37] , and the unique sensor ID s :
Locator ID Authentication: We use the following scheme based on efficient oneway hash chains [15] , to provide locator ID authentication. Each locator L i has a unique password P W i , blinded with the use of a collision-resistant hash function such as SHA1 [37] . Due to the collision resistance property, it is computationally infeasible for an attacker to find a P W j , such that H(P W i ) = H(P W j ), P W i = P W j . The hash sequence is generated using the following equation:
with n being a large number and H 0 never revealed to any sensor. Each sensor is preloaded with a table containing the ID of each locator and the corresponding hash value H n (P W i ). For a network with 400 locators, we need 9 bits to represent locator IDs. In addition, collision-resistant hash functions such as SHA1 [37] have a 160-bit output. Hence, the storage requirement of the hash table at any sen- sor is 8.45Kbytes
2 . To reduce the storage needed at the locators, we employ an efficient storage/computation method for hash chains of time/storage complexity O(log 2 (n)) [8] .
The j th broadcasted beacon from locator L i includes the hash value H n−j (P W i ), along with the index j. Every sensor that hears the beacon accepts the message only if H(H n−j+1 (P W i )) = H n−j (P W i ). After verification, the sensor replaces H n−j+1 (P W i ) with H n−j (P W i ) in its memory and increases the hash counter by one so as to perform only one hash operation in the reception of the next beacon from the same locator L i . The index j is included in the beacons so that sensors can resynchronize with the current published hash value in case of loss of some intermediate hash values. The beacon of locator L i has the following format:
where || denotes the concatenation operation and {m} K denotes the encryption of message m with key K. Note that our method does not provide end-to-end locator authentication, but only guarantees authenticity for the messages received from locators directly heard to a sensor. This condition is sufficient to secure our localization scheme against possible attacks. The pseudocode for SeRLoc is presented in Figure  8 . The pseudocode for HiRLoc is presented in Figure 9 .
Threat Analysis
In this section, we show how SeRLoc and HiRLoc are resilient to the attacks described in Section 2. Note that our goal to allow sensors to determine their location, even in the presence of attacks and not to prevent attacks that may be harmful in other network protocols.
The Wormhole Attack Threat Model
In the case of our location estimation process an attacker launching a wormhole attack records the beacons transmitted from locators at the origin point of the attack and replays them at the destination point, thus providing false localization information to the sensors attacked. In Figure 10 (a), the attacker records beacons at region B, tunnels them via the wormhole link in region A, and replays them, thus leading sensor s to believe that it can hear locators {L 1 ∼ L 8 }.
Detecting Wormholes
In the case of a wormhole attack, the cryptography used to secure the beacon transmissions, and to authenticate the source of the information is not violated. Wormholes violate the geometry of the network by enabling the propagation of messages at a distance longer than the communication range [30] . Hence, in the case of the wormhole attack, additional non-cryptographic mechanisms are needed to detect the geometry violation. We now show how a sensor can detect a wormhole attack using two consistency check properties: Proof. In the absence of any attack, a sensor can hear multiple sectors due to multipath effects. In addition, a sensor located at the boundary of two sectors can also hear multiple sectors even if there is no multipath or attack. We assume that the same but fresh hash value is used to authenticate them per beacon transmission. Hence, sensors will only accept the first message arriving from any sector of the same locator, per transmission. Due to the use of an identical but fresh hash in all sectors per transmission, if an adversary replays a message from any sector of a locator directly heard by the sensor under attack, the sensor will have already received the hash via the direct path and, hence, detect the attack and reject the message.
If we consider reception of multiple messages containing the same hash value due to multipath effects or imperfect sectorization to be a replay attack, a sensor will always assume it is under attack when it receives messages with the same hash value. Hence, an adversary launching a wormhole attack will always be detected if it replays a message from locator Figure  11 Claim. The detection probability P (SG) due to the single message/sector per locator property is equal to the probability that at least one locator lies within an area of size A c , and is given by:
with l as the distance between the origin point and the sensor under attack. 
Proof. If a locator L i lies inside

P (SG) = P (|LH
where A c can be computed from Figure 10 (b) to be: 
Communication Range Violation Property:
Given the coordinates of node s, all locators LH s heard by s should lie within a circle of radius R, centered at s. Since node s is not aware of its location it relies on its knowledge of the locator-to-sensor communication range R to verify that the set LH s satisfies Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Communication range constraint property: A sensor s cannot hear two locators
Proof. Any locator L i ∈ LH s has to lie within a circle of radius R, centered at the sensor s (area A s in Figure 11 
Using the coordinates of LH s , a sensor can detect a wormhole attack if the communication range constraint property is violated. We now compute the detection probability P (CR) due to the communication range constraint property.
Claim.
A wormhole attack is detected due to the communication range constraint property, with a probability:
where
Proof. Consider Figure 11(b) , where s − O = 2R. If any two locators within A s , A o have a distance larger that 2R, a wormhole attack is detected. Though P (CR) is not easily computed analytically, we can obtain a lower bound on P (CR) by considering the following event. In Figure 11( 
where (15) follows from the fact that the probability of the intersection of two events is always less or equal to the probability of one of the events, (16) follows from the definition of the conditional probability, (17) follows from the fact that when LH A i ,A j is true, we always have a communication range constraint violation (P (CR | LH A i ,A j ) = 1), and (18) follows from the fact that A i , A j are disjoint areas and that locators are randomly deployed. We can maximize the lower bound of P (CR), by finding the optimal values A * i , A * j . In fact it can be shown that the lower bound in (18) attains its maximum value when A * i = max i {A i } subject to the constraint A i = A j (A i , A j are symmetric) [17] . and is given by:
Inserting (19) into (18) yields the required result:
In Figure 12 (b), we show the maximum lower bound on P (CR) vs. the locator density ρ L , and the distance s − O normalized over R. The lower bound on Detection Probability P det of the Wormhole Attack: We now combine the two detection mechanisms, namely the single message/sector per locator property and the communication range constraint property for computing the detection probability of a wormhole attack.
Claim. The detection probability of a wormhole attack is lower bounded by
Proof. In the computation of the communication range constraint property, by setting A i = A j and maximizing A i regardless of the distance s − O , the areas A i , A j , and A c do not overlap as shown in Figure 11 (c). Hence, the corresponding events of finding a locator at any of these areas are independent and we can derive a lower bound on the detection probability P det by combining the two properties.
The left side of (20) is a lower bound on P det since P (CR) was also lower bounded.
In Figure 12 (c), we show the lower bound on P det vs. the locator density ρ L and
s will be more than 2R away from any L j ∈ LH r s and hence, the wormhole attack is always detected. From Figure 12 (c), we observe that a wormhole attack is detected with a probability very close to unity, independent of the origin and destination point of the attack. The pseudocode of ACLA is presented in Figure 13 . Note that the closest locator to sensor s will always reply first if it directly hears the broadcast from s, and not through a replay from an adversary. In order for an adversary to force sensor s to accept set LH To execute ACLA, a sensor must be able to communicate bidirectionally with at least one locator. The probability P s→L of a sensor having a bidirectional link with at least one locator and the probability P bd that all sensors can bidirectionally communicate with at least one locator can be computed as:
Attach to Closer Locator Algorithm (ACLA)
Hence, we can select the system parameters ρ L , G so every sensor has a bidirectional link with at least one locator with any desired probability.
Impersonation (Sybil) Attack
An adversary can launch an impersonation attack against SeRLoc or HiRLoc if it successfully impersonates locators. Since sensors are pre-loaded with valid locator IDs along with the hash values corresponding to the head of the reversed hash chain for each locator, an adversary can only impersonate locators by compromising the globally shared key K 0 . Once K 0 has been compromised, the adversary has access to both locators IDs, the hash chain values published by the locators, as well as the coordinates of the locators. Since sensors always have the latest published hash values from the locators that they directly hear, an adversary can only impersonate locators that are not directly heard to the sensors under attack. The adversary can generate bogus beacons, attach an already published hash value from a locator not heard by the sensor under attack, and encrypt it with the compromised K 0 .
Depending on the type of locators used, static or mobile, an adversary can impersonate locators in different ways. If the locators are static and their location is known before deployment, the coordinates of all locators can be preloaded to every sensor. Hence, the adversary cannot advertise a location that is different from the actual coordinates of an impersonated locator. In such a case, the Sybil attack is equivalent to a replay attack since the adversary cannot alter the content of the beacons 3 . If the locators are mobile, or their coordinates cannot be preloaded to the sensors before deployment, the adversary can place the impersonated locators to arbitrary positions. Hence, by impersonating a higher number of locators than the ones directly heard by the sensor under attack, the adversary can compromise the majority vote scheme of SeRLoc and displace the sensor.
Defense against the Sybil Attack: Though we do not provide a mechanism to prevent an adversary from impersonating locators except for the ones directly heard by a sensor, we can still determine the position of sensors in the presence of Sybil attack. In the case where sensors know a priori the coordinates of the locators, the sensor can detect the Sybil attack with the same mechanisms used for the wormhole attack, since the Sybil attack becomes a beacon replay. In the case where the coordinates of the locators are not preloaded to the sensors, an adversary can manipulate the coordinates of the impersonated locators, so that neither of the wormhole defense mechanisms detect an anomaly. The adversary needs to impersonate more than LH d s locators in order to displace the sensor s. To avoid sensor displacement we rely on the invariability of the locator deployment statistics to detect locator impersonation.
Since the locator density ρ L is known before deployment, we can select a threshold value L max as the maximum allowable number of locators heard by each sensor. If a sensor hears more than L max locators, it assumes that it is under attack and executes ACLA to determine its position. The probability that a sensor s hears more than L max locators is given by:
, a choice of L max = 46 allows a sensor to localize itself when under Sybil attack with a probability P (|LHs| ≥ 23) = 0.995, while the false positive alarm probability is P (|LH s | 46) = 0.1045.
Using (22), we can select the value of L max so that there is a very small probability for a sensor to hear more than L max locators, while there is a very high probability for a sensor to hear more than Lmax 2 locators. If a sensor hears more than L max locators without being under attack, the detection mechanism will result in a false positive alarm and force the sensor to execute ACLA to successfully locate itself. However, if a sensor hears less than L max 2 , the sensor is vulnerable to a Sybil attack. Therefore, we must select a threshold L max so that any sensor hears less than Lmax 2 locators with a probability very close to zero. In Figure 14 , we show Figure 14 , we can select the appropriate L max for each value of ρ L . For example, when ρ L = 0.03, a choice of L max = 46 allows a sensor to localize itself when under Sybil attack with a probability P (|LH s | ≥ 23) = 0.995, while the false positive alarm probability is P (|LH s | 46) = 0.1045.
Compromised Network Entities
In this section, we examine the robustness of SeRLoc and HiRLoc to compromised network entities. We consider a sensor node or a locator node to be compromised if an attacker assumes full control over the behavior of the node and knows all the keys stored at the compromised node.
Compromised Sensors: Though sensors are assumed to be easier to compromise, an attacker has no incentive to compromise sensors, since they do not actively participate in the localization procedure. The only benefit in compromising a sensor is to gain access to the globally shared key K 0 .
Compromised Locators: An adversary that compromises a locator L i gains access to the globally shared key K 0 , the pairwise keys K s,L i shared between the locator and every sensor, as well as all the hash values of the locator's hash chain. By compromising a single locator, the adversary can displace any sensor, by impersonating the compromised locator from a position closer to the sensor under attack compared to the closest legitimate locator. The adversary impersonates multiple locators in order to force location ambiguity to the sensor under attack. Once the attack is detected, sensor s executes ACLA to resolve its location ambiguity. Since the adversary is closer to the sensor s than the closest legitimate locator, its reply will arrive to s first. Hence, s will assume that the impersonated set of locators is the valid one and will be displaced.
To avoid sensor displacement by a single locator compromise, we can intensify the resilience to locator compromise by involving more than one locators in the location resolution algorithm at the expense of higher communication overhead. A sensor s under attack, can execute the Enhanced Location Resolution Algorithm (ELRA) that follows.
-Step 1:
Sensor s broadcasts a randomly generated nonce η s , the set of locators heard LH s and its ID s .
Step 2: Every locator L i receiving the broadcast from s appends its coordinates, the next hash value of its hash chain and its ID Li , encrypts the message with K 0 and re-broadcasts the message to all sectors.
-Step 3: Every locator receiving the rebroadcast, verifies the authenticity of the message, and that the transmitting locator is within its range. If the verification is correct and the receiving locator belongs to LH s , the locator broadcasts a new beacon with location information and the nonce η s encrypted with the pairwise key K s,Li with sensor s.
-Step 4:
The sensor collects the first L max authentic replies from locators and executes SeRLoc with LH s = L max .
The pseudocode for the enhanced location resolution algorithm is presented in Figure 15 . Note that for a locator to hear the sensor's broadcast, it has to be within a range r sL = rG 1 γ from the sensor. Furthermore, in order for a the sensor to make the correct location estimate, all locators within a range R from s need to provide new beacon information.
Claim. Every locator positioned within R from a sensor s is within the range of any locator positioned at a distance r sL from the sensor s. Proof. For any locator positioned at a distance r sL from the sensor s to reach any locator positioned at a distance R from sensor s, the following condition has to hold:
Enhanced Location Resolution Algorithm (ELRA)
Since R ≥ rG 2 γ by assumption, and G 2 γ ≥ 1, the left side of (26) is always greater than one.
Each beacon broadcast from a locator has to include the nonce η s initially broadcasted by the sensor and be encrypted with the pairwise key between the sensor and the locator. Hence, given that the sensor has at least Lmax 2 locators within range R with very high probability (see Figure 14) , the adversary has to compromise at least
+ 1 locators, in order to compromise the majority vote scheme of SeRLoc. In addition, the attacker has to possess the hardware capabilities to process and transmit
replies from valid locators reach the sensor under attack. Our enhanced location resolution algorithm significantly increases the resilience of SeRLoc to locator compromise at the expense of higher communication overhead at the locators.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluated the performance of SeRLoc and HiRLoc with respect to their localization accuracy. To emulate the conditions of a real deployment, we also evaluated SeRLoc under error in the locators' coordinates and false estimation of the antenna sector that includes the sensors and empirically showed that SeRLoc is robust against both sources of error.
Simulation Setup
We randomly distributed 5,000 sensors within a 100x100m 2 rectangular area. We also randomly placed locators within the same area and computed the average localization error as: 
where S is the set of sensors,s i is the sensor estimated position, s i is the real position and r is the sensor-to-sensor communication range.
Localization Error vs. Locators Heard
In our first experiment, we investigated the impact of the average number of locators heard LH on the localization error. In Figures 16(a) and (b), we show the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the localization error for SeRLoc when 3-sector antennas are used at the locators and the average number of locators heard are LH = 6 and LH = 8, respectively. We observe that for LH = 4, the error is more evenly distributed among its possible values with 90% of the sensors having an error of less than 1.2r, while for LH = 8, more than 90% of the sensors have an error smaller than 0.7r. The highest localization error occurs when a sensor hears only one locator L i and is R units away from L i . The probability for such an event to occur can be set to an arbitrary small value by deploying a sufficient number of locators. For example, when LH = 8, the probability for a sensor to hear just one locator is P (|LH| = 1) = 2.7x10 −3 . In Figure 17 (a) we show the ROI vs. the number of antenna rotations, and for varying LH, when 3-sector antennas are used at each locator. Note that the ROI is normalized over the size of the ROI given by SeRLoc denoted by ROI(1) (no antenna rotation). From Figure 17 (a), we observe that even a single antenna rotation, reduces the size of the ROI by more than 50%, while three antenna rotations reduce the size to ROI(4) = 0.12ROI(1), when LH = 5. A reduction of 50% in the size of the ROI by a single antenna rotation means that one can deploy half the locators compared to SeRLoc and achieve the same localization accuracy by just rotating the locators' antennas once. The savings in locators are significant considering that the reduction in hardware requirements comes at no additional communication cost. We also observe that as LH increases, HiRLoc provides diminishing returns. This is due to the fact that when the number of locators heard at each sensor is high, SeRLoc already provides a good location estimate (small ROI) and, hence, the margin for reduction of the ROI size is limited. In Figure 17 (b) we show the normalized ROI vs. the number of communication range reductions, and for different LH values, when locators are equipped with 3-sector antennas.
From Figure 17 (b), we observe that the communication range variation, though significantly improves the system performance, does not achieve the same ROI reduction as the antenna orientation variation 4 . This behavior is explained by the fact that the gradual reduction of the communication range reduces the number of beacons heard at each sensor, in contrast with the antenna orientation variation case where the same number of locators is heard at the sensors at each antenna rotation. In addition, we observe that greater ROI reduction occurs when the LH at each locator is high. This is justified by considering that a higher LH allows for more sectors with lower communication range to intersect and hence, smaller ROI.
Localization Error vs. Sector Error
Sensors may be located close to the boundary of two sectors of a locator, or be deployed in a region with high multipath effects. In such a case, a sensor may falsely assume that it is located in another sector, than the actual sector that includes it. We refer to this error as sector error (SE) defined as: A sector error of 0.5 indicates that every sensor falsely estimated the sectors of half the locators heard. In Figure 18 (a), we show the LE vs. the SE for varying LH, and 8-sector antennas. We observe that the LE does not grow significantly large (larger than the sensor communication range r), until a fraction of 0.7 of the sectors are falsely estimated.
SeRLoc is resilient to sector error due to the majority vote scheme employed in the determination of the overlapping region. Even if a significant fraction of sectors are falsely estimated, these sectors do not overlap in the same network area and hence a score low in the grid-sector table.
Note that for a SE 0.7, LE increases with LH. When the SE grows beyond a threshold, the falsely estimated sectors dominate in the location determination. As LH grows, the falsely estimated overlapping region, shrinks due to the higher number of overlapping sectors. Therefore, the CoG that defines the sensor's location gets further apart than the actual sensor location.
In Figure 18 (b), we show the LE vs. SE for LH = 10 and varying number of antenna sectors. We observe that the narrower the antenna sector the smaller the LE, even in the presence of SE. For a small SE the overlapping region is dominated by the correctly estimated sectors and shrinks with increasing antenna sectors. For large SE the overlapping region is dominated by the false sectors and an increase in LH does not reduce the LE.
Related Work
An extensive literature exists for location estimation schemes for WSN in a benign environment [4, 10, 12, 25, 27, 31, [34] [35] [36] . Recently, a number of articles have appeared addressing the problem of sensor location estimation and verification in an adversarial setting [3, 5, 7, 14, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 33] .
Sastry et al. [33] proposed the ECHO protocol for verifying the location claim of a node, using a challenge response scheme and a combination of RF and Ultrasound signals. ECHO is based on a distance bounding protocol proposed by Brands and Chaum [3] .Capkun and Hubaux proposed Verifiable Multilateration (VM) for securing range-based localization schemes [5] . In VM, a node must verify its distance to at least three reference points in order to securely estimate its position.Capkun et al. also proposed a location verification method based on hidden reference points that can verify the validity of the location claims of nodes [7] .
Liu et al. [23] proposed an attack-resistant location estimation technique that can filter bogus beacon information provided that the majority of significant majority of beacons is benign. Li et al. [21] discuss a variety of attacks specific to the localization process and propose robust statistical methods that provide attack resistant localization. Finally, Kuhn [14] has proposed an asymmetric security mechanism for securing GPS-like navigation signals.
Open Problems
While the schemes that have been proposed for secure location estimation in WSNs [5, 7, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 33] are a significant step forward in providing a transparent and secure localization service, several problems remain open. The dependency of the location estimation schemes to physical characteristics such as received signal strength [1] , time of arrival or time difference of arrival [27, 34] , allows side-channel attacks not related to the strength of the cryptographic primitives used to secure the communication [19, 21, 22] .
To combat side-channel attacks a series of consistency checks have been proposed [17] [18] [19] 22] . It remains an open problem which of the modalities of a sensor network used to detect attacks against the localization process are invariant to sidechannel attacks. The ability of an adversary to alter the physical properties used for localization and distort the environment can significantly impact the localization accuracy.
Furthermore, current secure location estimation techniques do not provide any guarantee on the localization accuracy. The analytical evaluation of the localization error in the presence of adversaries is a problem requiring further investigation. Finally, most secure localization schemes studied localization for static sensor networks. Securing the location estimation process when the reference points, the sensors or both are mobile remains an open problem.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the problem of location estimation for WSN in an adversarial environment. We have demonstrated a series of attacks relevant to range-independent localization methods, such as the relay attack, the impersonation attack and compromise of reference points. We showed that securing the location estimation process requires not only securing the communication link between the reference points and the sensors, but also additional non-cryptographic consistency checks based on invariant properties such as the communication range or the network deployment statistics.
We proposed a range-independent, decentralized localization scheme called SeRLoc that allows sensors to determine their location in an untrusted environment. We also proposed HiRLoc, a secure location estimation algorithm that relies on the superposition of location information over time to improve the location estimation accuracy. We analytically evaluated the probability of sensor displacement due to security threats in WSNs such as the wormhole attack, the Sybil attack, and compromise of network entities and showed that SeRLoc and HiRLoc provide accurate location estimation even in the presence of these threats. In doing so, we used the geometric and radio range information to detect the attacks on the localization.
Our performance evaluation studies showed that our algorithm are resilient to sources of error such as location error of reference points as well as error in the sector determination. We identified the integration of new modalities for consistency checks, the analytical evaluation of the location estimation error in the presence of adversaries and the secure location estimation for mobile sensor networks as areas of future research.
